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The past several years have witnessed significant changes in
the law of attorney malpractice. Erosion of doctrines which have
heretofore been advantageous to attorneys has caused an increase
in the vulnerability of attorneys to suit for malpractice. Further,
clients are apparently more willing than ever to sue their attor-
neys, resulting in an increase in both the number and size of recov-
eries.' Because of the increased vulnerability of attorneys to
malpractice actions, a knowledge of the elements of a cause of ac-
tion for malpractice, as well as the recent developments in the
area, is essential to the legal practitioner.
In order to present a coherent analysis of legal malpractice, this
comment will be structured according to the form of analysis advo-
cated by Leon Green.2 Green's form of analysis provides a useful
and logical framework with which to analyze negligence cases in
1. Luvera, How to Avoid Legal Malpractice, 31 Mo. B.J. 127, 127 (1975). Suc-
cessful claims against attorneys increased by 25 percent in the years 1970 to
1975, and the upward trend is continuing. The size of claims recovered has
climbed as well, up more than one-third since 1965. Id.
The following is a breakdown of the major grounds for malpractice liabil-
ity: errors involving statutes of limitations, missed appearances in court, mis-
filed documents, failure to file lawsuits on time, and similar "forgetfulness"
(45%); errors in legal judgment (25%); unclear relationship between clients
and lawyers (21%); alleged fraud on the part of a lawyer (9%). Id.
2. Leon Green is currently a professor of law at the University of Texas, and was
formerly the Dean of the School of Law at Northwestern University. He is
the author of numerous books and articles on the study bf tort law.
Green writes that the correct identification and formulation of the basic
issues in negligence cases is essential to the proper resolution of the cases.
See Green, Identification of Issues in Negligence Cases, 26 Sw. L.T. 811, 811
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Identification of Issues]. According to Green,
the following elements are necessary for the proper formulation of the issues,
in their logical sequence:
1. Causation-is there a causal connection between defendant's con-
duct and plaintiff's injury?
2. Duty-assuming that a causal connection has been established, did
defendant owe plaintiff a duty which protects plaintiff against the
risk of injury he has suffered?
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general, and is applicable to attorney malpractice cases in particu-
lar. This comment will formulate and discuss the issues of attor-
ney malpractice in their proper order- causation, duty (focusing on
the issue of privity), negligence (discussing primarily develop-
ments in the applicable standard of care), damages, and defenses.
II. CAUSATION-THE CAUSAL RELATION
"The identification of a defendant and proof of a causal connec-
tion between his conduct and the victim's injury is a gateway issue
that cannot be ignored in any negligence case. . . ."3 Green de-
fines causal relation as a neutral issue of fact, blind to right or
wrong, which is a simple inquiry into the fact of defendant's contri-
bution to the injury.4 It is essential that this causal relation be
established first, for without it plaintiff has no case, and all other
issues are moot.5
To prove casual relation, many courts have developed the "but
for" test: "[T] he defendant's conduct is not a cause of the event, if
the event would have occurred without it." '6 It is, therefore, neces-
sary that as a first step in proving a cause of attorney malpractice,
the plaintiff prove that "but for" the attorney's conduct, plaintiff
3. Negligence-if defendant's duty extended to plaintiff, did defendant
violate this duty by breaching the applicable standard of care?
4. Damages-if defendant violated the standard of care, what amount of
damages is owed to plaintiff?
5. Defenses-what may defendant show to disprove any of these requi-
sites?
Green, The Negligence Action, 1974 ARiz. ST. L.J. 369, 374-75 [hereinafter cited
as The Negligence Action].
3. Identification of Issues, supra note 2, at 813.
4. Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. I REv. 543,
548-49 (1962). See also W. PROSSER, TORTS § 41, at 237 (4th ed. 1971). Causal
relation, an issue of fact, must be distinguished from proximate cause, an is-
sue of law. Both Green and Prosser relate the concept of proximate cause to
that of duty. In considering whether an actual cause of plaintiffs injury is a
proximate cause of that harm, a court should focus on the policy issues which
determine the extent of the original obligation and of its continuance-that is,
the duty defendant owes to plaintiff to protect him from the risk of harm
incurred-rather than at the mechanical sequence of events which contrib-
utes to causation in fact. Id. at 244, L GREEN, RATioNALE OF PROXIMATE
CAUSE 11-14, 39-43 (1927).
5. Green, supra note 4, at 549. There is great advantage in considering the
causal issue first; defendant's conduct is a factual issue, as is the victim's
injury, and the causal relation between the two is a factual concept Duty,
negligence and damages are legal issues which will not even arise unless the
causal relation is first established. Id.
6. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 41, at 239. The "but for" test is at most a rule of
exclusion, however, for even if the event would not have occurred "but for"
defendant's conduct, it still does not follow that liability exists, since other
considerations, such as duty, may prevent it Id.
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would not have suffered harm. It is clear that plaintiff has the bur-
den of proving causal relation between defendant's conduct and
the injury.7 In many cases, however, this burden presents no
problem to plaintiff as the causal relation between defendant's
conduct and plaintiffs injury is so obvious that the issue is not
contested. For example, if an attorney overlooks an outstanding
lien in approving an abstract, that conduct is clearly the cause of
the plaintiff being subject to the lien.8
In addition to proving causal relation, it has been argued that in
a suit for giving erroneous advice, plaintiff should be required to
prove that the advice was the sole proximate cause of the loss suf-
fered.9 Most courts have rejected this contention, however, and
have held that erroneous advice need only be a cause of the in-
jury.'0 This result is supported by important policy considera-
tions. To require plaintiff to prove that defendant's conduct was
the sole cause of the injury would be to subject plaintiff to an im-
possibly heavy burden of proof. Causation, after all, cannot be
proved with mathematical precision."
Notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff need only prove defend-
ant's conduct to be a cause of the injury, plaintiff still faces a diffi-
cult burden of proving causal relation in the case of loss caused by
the negligent conduct of litigation. 12 When charging his attorney
with negligence in ligitation, plaintiff must prove that but for the
attorney's conduct, the original action would have been success-
7. Id. at 241: "[Plaintiff] must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable
basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that conduct of the
defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the result."
8. See, e.g., Hill v. Cloud, 48 Ga. App. 506, 173 S.E. 190 (1934).
9. See, e.g., Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 526, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 598
(1966); Modica v. Crist, 129"Cal. App. 2d 144, 147, 276 P.2d 614, 615 (1954); Ward
v. Arnold, 52 Wash. 2d 581, 584, 328 P.2d 164, 166 (1958).
10. Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 157, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 418 (1968); Ish-
mael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 526,50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 598 (1966); Mod-
ica v. Crist, 129 Cal. App. 2d 144, 147, 276 P.2d 614, 615 (1954); Ward v. Arnold,
52 Wash. 2d 581, 584-85, 328 P.2d 164, 166-67 (1958).
11. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 41, at 242:
[Plaintiff] need not negative entirely the possibility that the defend-
ant's conduct was not a cause, and it is enough that he introduces
evidence from which reasonable men may conclude that it is more
probable that the event was caused by the defendant than that it was
not. The fact of causation is incapable of mathematical proof, since
no man can say with absolute certainty what would have occurred if
the defendant had acted otherwise.
12. Comment, New Developments in Legal Malpractice, 26 Am. U.L REV. 408,433-
34 (1977) ("A client faces the most difficult burden of proving causation when
he alleges that his attorney was negligent in preparing or conducting litiga-
tion."); Comment, Legal Malpractice, 27 AmR. L. REV. 452, 466 (1973) ("in
many circumstances the burden of proving causation is an extremely difficult
one to meet").
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ful,13 or that the case would have succeeded on appeal.14 Such
proof can only be established by trying the original action in the
malpractice action-the so-called "suit within a suit."' 5 In order to
prevail in a malpractice action, plaintiff must prove the existence
of a sound claim or defense in the original action, or that the de-
fendant negligently failed to effect an appeal that would have been
sustained. In addition, even if the original claim was valid, some
jurisdictions have required that plaintiff prove that the original de-
fendant was solvent to the extent of the judgment.16 As one com-
mentator states: "If the plaintiff in a malpractice action would have
lost the original suit notwithstanding the attorney's negligence,
then that negligence did not cause any injury in fact, and no liabil-
ity attaches.' 17
13. See, e.g., Trustees of Schools of Township 42 N. v. Schroeder, 2 Ill. App. 3d
1009, 278 N.E.2d 431 (1971) (on a counterclaim against attorney for malprac-
tice for failing to raise an appeal, client must prove that the cause of action
would have succeeded but for attorney's conduct); Masters v. Dunstan, 256
N.C. 520, 124 S.E.2d 574 (1962) (although attorney was negligent in defending
his client in litigation, there is no liability where client had no meritorious
defense). See also Cook v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. App. 3d 832, 97 Cal. Rptr.
189 (1971); Freeman v. Rubin, 318 So. 2d 540 (Fla. Ct. App. 1975).
14. Better Homes, Inc. v. Rodgers, 195 F. Supp. 93 (N.D.W. Va. 1961) (where attor-
ney failed to prosecute timely appeal, plaintiff may not recover where there
was a failure to prove that appeal would have resulted in reversal of trial
court); Kilmer v. Carter, 274 Cal. App. 2d 81, 78 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969) (failure to
prosecute appeal did not amount to negligence inasmuch as the client would
have lost the case on appeal); Pusey v. Reed, 258 A.2d 460 (Del. Super. 1969)
(to sustain malpractice action for failure to take an appeal, it must be shown
that more favorable result would have been reached on appeal).
15. See Coggin, Attorney Negligence-A Suit Within A Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REv. 225
(1958). Some commentators emphasize that the purpose of a suit within a
suit is to ascertain the amount of damages. Id. at 233-34, Gillen, Legal
Malpractice, 12 WASH. UJ.J. 281, 292-93 (1973). Although this may be one
function of the procedure, its main function is to ascertain whether there ex-
ists a causal relation between defendant's conduct and plaintiffs injury. In-
deed, in certain cases of attorney misconduct it would not seem necessary to
prove monetary damages to sustain a cause of action. See note 17 infra.
16. Sitton v. Clements, 257 F. Supp. 63 (E.D. Tenn. 1966); Lawson v. Sigfrid, 83
Colo. 116, 262 P. 1018 (1927); Jones v. Wright, 19 Ga. 242, 91 S.E. 265 (1917);
McDow v. Dixon, 138 Ga. App. 338, 226 S.E.2d 145 (1976).
17. Comment, New Developments in Legal Malpractice, supra note 12, at 434.
This statement is correct only to the extent that "injury in fact" is defined to
mean monetary damages, and only to the extent that monetary damages are
a necessary element of Green's causal relation test. It may be argued, how-
ever, that while "injury"--given its broadest meaning-is a necessary ele-
ment of causal relation, monetary damages are not, and are a separate issue
to be resolved at a different stage of the proceedings.
It is not hard to imagine a situation in which an attorney's conduct could
cause injury without causing monetary damages. If, for example, an attor-
ney failed to file suit within the applicable statute of limitations, plaintiff
would have suffered injury even though it be shown that plaintiff would not
have recovered in the original action. In the first place, even if it were shown
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Although it has been argued that the California Supreme Court
has recently relaxed the suit within a suit -requirement,18 it is un-
likely that the requirement would or could be abandoned.19 The
suit within a suit requirement may place a heavy burden of proof
upon plaintiff,20 but it still remains an accurate means of proving
causation in an attorney malpractice action.
DI DUTY-THE PRIVITY ISSUE
Assuming that a causal connection is established, plaintiff must
then establish a duty2' the defendant owes the plaintiff which pro-
tects the plaintiff against risk of the injury which was suffered.22
The scope of duty is always an issue of law for the court, and how
far this duty to protect plaintiffs will extend is decided on the basis
of public policy.23
that plaintiff would not have recovered at trial, each suit when filed has at
least a settlement or nuisance value. To the extent that this is lost due to
attorney's conduct, plaintiff should be able to recover damages. Further, to
the extent that every case serves a cathartic function as a combat substitute,
every litigant derives some benefit from the prosecution of a case, win or lose,
by being assured that justice has been satisfied. See C. CuRrs, IT'S YoiR
LAW 3-4 (1954). To the extent that an attorney's misconduct has caused the
loss of such benefit there is injury, and Green's causal relation test should
apply.
18. Note, Legal Malpractice-Erosion of the Traditional Suit Within a Suit
Requirement, 7 U. ToL. L. REv. 328, 338-39 (1975). Commenting on Smith v.
Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975), this student com-
mentator claims that the court allowed causal relation to be inferred from a
finding of negligence by the jury.
19. Comment, New Developments in Legal Malpractice, supra note 12, at 435, ar-
gues that the interpretation found in Note, supra note 18, is incorrect The
jury in Smith was instructed that, in order to hold the defendant attorney
liable, it must find both that he was negligent and that his negligence was the
cause of plaintiff's injury. By finding for the plaintiff, the jury impliedly
found that both conditions were met.
20. Plaintiffs burden of proof may not be as great as it seems, particularly in
those cases in which the source of the suit is the attorney's failure to bring a
case to trial, rather than the attorney's negligence at trial If defendant attor-
ney's defense is to prove that plaintiff would not have recovered in the origi-
nal suit, he or she may very well be handicapped by not having access to
evidence available to the original defendants.
21. The duty is the exercise of ordinary care or some more exacting care com-
mensurate with the dangers involved. The duty of care may be based on a
statute, some common law principle or undertaking, or on the inadequate
performance of a contract. The Negligence Action, supra note 2, at 378.
22. Identification of Issues, supra note 2, at 811. The extent of a defendant's
duty has often been treated as a question of proximate cause. Id. at 815; W.
PROSSER, supra note 4, § 42, at 244. See note 4 supra.
23. The Negligence Action, supra note 2, at 378; W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 42, at
244. Public policy enables a court to exclude or include the risks of injury
sought to be brought under the protection of the particular duty owed the
victim. According to Green, there are five factors of policy which have the
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In the area of attorney malpractice, even though a causal con-
nection has been shown between the attorney's conduct and the
plaintiff's injury, the attorney will not be liable unless he or she
had a duty to protect plaintiff from the risk of harm. Traditionally,
attorneys owed a duty only to those with whom they were in priv-
ity of contract,24 and this rule until recently has been immutable. 25
The requirement of privity in attorney malpractice cases was
established in the United States in Savings Bank v. Ward.26 In
this case the defendant attorney had examined title to a piece of
real estate for the owner of the land, and certified the title as valid.
On the strength of this certification plaintiff loaned the owner a
large sum of money, which was subsequently lost when the title
greatest significance in the determination of the scope of duties: (1) the ad-
ministrative factor, (2) the ethical or moral factor, (3) the economic factor,
(4) the prophylactic factor, and (5) the justice factor. Green, The Duty Prob-
lem in Negligence Cases (pt. 1), 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1014, 1034 (1928). The
administrative factor is of paramount importance to a court when asked to
extend the scope of a duty. A court will not extend a duty if to do so would
be unduly burdensome or expensive; if a court is requested to extend a duty
of protection owed by defendants to a new class of plaintiffs, the court will
not do so unless the class can be easily defined, the plaintiffs as individuals
can be determined with a minimum of effort, and the new class of plaintiffs is
reasonably limited. Id. at 1035-45.
The remaining factors are more difficult to articulate and apply. The
moral or ethical factor is the most compelling influence on judges when ad-
ministrative considerations offer no obstacles. This factor is composed of
those philosophical, religious and ethical tenets which are the unarticulated
moral foundations of society. Such tenets are the free will of an individual,
the capability to care for oneself, the "goodness" or "badness" of one's con-
duct, and the "practical affairs of everyday life." Green, The Duty Problem in
Negligence Cases (pt. 2), 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255, 255 (1929). The economic,
prophylactic and justice factors are concerned with future conduct. Dam-
ages are imposed, not merely for the individual offender's lesson, but to pre-
vent future harms as well. Further, judges will take the economic factor into
account when, all other factors being equal, they place the loss where it will
be felt the least and can best be borne. Finally, other factors being equal,
judges will give attention to the parties before them, rather than concentrate
solely on the legal aspect of the case. The injured plaintiff "captures the
heart" of judge and jury alike. This, according to Green, is the justice factor.
Id. at 255-56.
24. See, e.g., Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
25. See, e.g., McGlone v. Lacey, 288 F. Supp. 662 (D.S.D. 1968) (where there is no
attorney-client relationship there can be no breach or dereliction of duty by
attorney and therefore no liability); Jacobsen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 11
F.R.D. 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1950) (although an attorney must exercise good faith in
dealing with the third party, there is no liability to the third party unless
fraud, falsehood, or collusion is established); Weigel v. Hardesty, 549 P.2d
1335 (Colo. App. 1976) (while fulfilling obligation to client, attorney is liable
for injuries to third parties only when conduct is fraudulent or malicious);
Averill, Attorney's Liability to Third Persons for Negligent Malpractice, 2
LAND & WATER L. REV. 379, 380 (1967).
26. 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
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turned out to be invalid. Although it was conceded that had the
attorney made a proper title search he would have discovered the
fatal flaw, the Court held that the attorney was not liable to plain-
tiff for the amount lost. The Court adhered to the general rule that
an attorney owes a duty only to those with whom he is in privity of
contract,27 obviously fearing the "absurd consequences" 28 that
would ensue if the rule were otherwise, in that "there [would be]
no point at which such actions will stop."2 9 Most courts still ad-
here to the requirement of privity in legal malpractice actions,30
although there have been attempts to circumvent the rule.31
The privity requirement fulfills the function of protecting attor-
neys from an undue burden of liability.3 2 If an attorney were lia-
ble for every consequence of an action to every person that that
action affected, the practice of law would be prohibitively expen-
sive and many attorneys would be discouraged from practicing.
Yet the issue remains as to whether adherence to a strict require-
ment of privity is worth the cost of preventing worthy, innocent
plaintiffs from recovering. Further, the requirement of privity in
attorney malpractice cases is assuming an even more anomalous
position in light of the relaxation of privity requirements in other
areas of tort law.33
27. Id. at 200.
28. Id. at 203.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla.
1976); McGlone v. Lacey, 288 F. Supp. 662 (D.S.D. 1968); Sachs v. Levy, 216 F.
Supp. 44 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Jacobsen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 11 F.R.D. 97
(E.D.N.Y. 1950); Chalpin v. Brennan, 559 P.2d 680 (Ariz. App. 1976); Rose v.
Davis, 288 Ky. 674, 157 S.W.2d 284 (1941); Sterling v. Jones, 249 So. 2d 334 (La.
App. 1971); Reamer v. Kessler, 233 Md. 311, 196 A.2d 896 (1964); Ronnigen v.
Hertogs, 294 Minn. 7,199 N.W.2d 420 (1972); Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J. Super.
581, 362 A.2d 581 (1976); Victor v. Goldman, 74 Misc. 2d 685, 344 N.Y.S.2d 672
(Sup. Ct. 1973), affd, 351 N.Y.S.2d 956 (App. Div. 1974); Metzker v. Slocum,
272 Or. 313, 537 P.2d 74 (1975).
31. In order to circumvent the requirement of privity it has been argued that an
attorney's liability should be predicated on a third party beneficiary contract
theory. Averill, supra note 25, at 386. See generally J. CALAmAm & J. PE-
RHLO, CONTRACTS §§ 17-1 to 11 (1977). This theory has been applied where
the attorney's negligent drafting of a will has caused harm to one of the bene-
ficiaries. See, e.g., Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900 (1895). A third
party beneficiary contract will not provide any relief, however, where the
court finds plaintiff to be merely an incidental beneficiary of the contract
and, therefore, not within the rule. Id at 339, 42 P. at 901; J. CALA1mIA & J.
PERmLLO, supra § 17-2(b), at 607.
32. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. at 200.
33. The "assault upon the citadel of privity," Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y.
170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931), began with MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). The New York Court of Appeals there held
that an automobile owner could bring an action directly against the manufac-
turer for injury caused by a defective wheel despite the lack of privity. Since
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In the area of products liability, one rationale for abandoning
the privity requirement is that a consumer not in privity with the
manufacturer is the person most likely to be injured by a defective
product, and is least able to protect against the injury.34 A similar
situation arises in provision of certain kinds of legal services.
When an attorney negligently writes a will or searches a real estate
title, those not in privity will suffer the consequences of any mis-
feasance. It is, therefore, logical that the privity requirement be
relaxed in the area of attorney malpractice, if the end in view is
protection of innocent parties.
The courts have begun to abolish the privity requirement in ar-
eas other than products liability. In Glanzer v. Shepard35 for ex-
ample, defendant was engaged in business as a public weigher.
Defendant was hired by a merchant to weigh 905 bags of beans
which he then sold to plaintiff. Defendant weighed the beans and
certified the weight; plaintiff relied on the certification when he
purchased the beans, but when the actual weight turned out to be
less than the amount certified he sued defendant for the amount
he had overpaid the seller.
In an opinion written by Judge Cardozo, the New York Court of
Appeals affirmed a directed verdict for plaintiff.36 Judge Cardozo
imposed a duty on defendant which would extend to all who relied
on his certifications, not merely to those in privity with himY7 The
duty was deemed to arise not because of the character of the act's
consequences but from the "proximity or remoteness" of those
consequences in the mind of the actor.3
The importance of Glanzer lies in the fact that it extended the
decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.3 9 beyond the realm of
products liability to the point where "[ol ne who follows a common
calling may come under a duty to another whom he serves, though
a third may give the order or make the payment."4 Under appro-
priate circumstances-as when an attorney drafts a will or certifies
a title-this rule would apply to an attorney.4 1
MacPherson, the privity requirement has been eliminated in products liabil-
ity cases. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry
Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v.
Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
34. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. at 391, 111 N.E. at 1053.
35. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 240, 135 N.E. at 276.
39. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
40. Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. at 239, 135 N.E. at 276.
41. AveriU, supra note 25, at 388.
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In 1931 the New York Court of Appeals again considered the
privity issue in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche.4 Defendants were
public accountants who had been employed by a company to cer-
tify the validity of a balance sheet, which would establish its finan-
cial condition. Defendants, knowing that their certification would
be used for the purpose of obtaining credit, certified the company
as being financially sound when it was actually insolvent. Plain-
tiff relied on this certification by loaning the company substantial
sums of money, which were later lost when the company declared
bankruptcy.
Surprisingly, the New York Court of Appeals did not follow
Glanzer, but held the accounting firm not liable because of lack of
privity.43 The court distinguished Glanzer on the basis that in
Glanzer the certification of weight was intended by defendant to
be used primarily by plaintiff, thus creating a "bond... so close as
to approach that of privity,"44 while in Ultramares the situation
was otherwise. In the latter case the service was intended prima-
rily for the use of the hiring company and only incidentally for the
use of plaintiff and others to whom the company might later show
the balance sheet.45 The distinction that the court drew between
Glanzer and Ultramares is that in the former the class of third
party beneficiaries was small, determinate, and known to the de-
fendant, while in the latter case the class of third party benefi-
ciaries was potentially large, indeterminate, and not known to the
defendant.
Although not clearly articulated as the basis for its holding, the
New York Court of Appeals apparently used policy considerations
in deciding how far the duty owed by defendants extended.47 The
indeterminate size of the class which would make use of defend-
ant's balance sheet would cause insurmountable administrative
difficulties, leading the court to restrict the duty to cover only
those within an easily determinable class.
The administrative difficulties which were responsible for the
result in Ultramares could be avoided if a clearly articulated test
for determining the scope of duty in the absence of privity were
42. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 446.
45. Id. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446.
46. Imposition of a duty toward a large indeterminate class of plaintiffs raises the
specter of extremely large recoveries, especially in a sensitive profession
such as accounting. In Glanzer the damages alleged were small and more
within control of the defendants. This, as much as anything, may account for
the difference in result between the two cases. Averill, supra note 25, at 391.
47. See note 23 & accompanying text supra.
48. See note 23 supra.
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developed. Such a test was first articulated by the California
Supreme Court in Biakanja v. Irving.49 The case involved a no-
tary public who agreed and undertook to prepare a valid will for
the decedent. Not being a lawyer, the notary public apparently
failed to carry out the requisite formalities for validation of the
will. When the will failed, the sole beneficiary under the will sued
the notary for negligence. Because the beneficiary had had no
contract with the notary, privity was the pivotal issue.
In affirming the beneficiary's verdict in the trial court, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court discussed the rapid developments in the law
on this problem, 50 particularly in the area of products liability.
The court noted that liability to third persons for injury to an "in-
tangible interest" was not so well established,51 but formulated a
rule which articulated the policy considerations inherent in the
question of scope of duty:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be
held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves
the balancing of various factors, among which are [11 the extent to which
the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, [21 the foreseeability
of harm to him, [3] the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered in-
jury, [4] the closeness of the connection between defendant's conduct and
the injury suffered, [5] the moral blame attached to the defendant's con-
duct, and [6] the policy of preventing future harm.
52
The significance of Biakanja is that it clearly defined the factors to
be used in determining when a defendant's duty extends to a third
party not in privity. But if there was any doubt that Biakanja
would be restricted to its facts, this was quickly dispelled by Lucas
v. Hamm,53 decided by the same court three years later.
Defendant, a practicing attorney, was employed by the testator
to draft his will. Plaintiffs were the beneficiaries under a residu-
ary trust set up in the will. After the death of the testator, the
attorney informed the beneficiaries that the trust provision he had
drafted was void as a violation of the rule against perpetuities.
The beneficiaries settled an attack against the trust, and sued the
attorney for the difference between the amount they would have
received under the trust and the amount for which they settled.
49. 49 Cal 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
50. Id. at 649-50, 320 P.2d at 18-19.
51. Id. (citing Glanzer and Ultramares).
52. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19. These factors are similar to
those posited by Green as having the greatest significance in determining the
scope of duty. See note 23 supra. Indeed, Green's assertion that the adminis-
trative factor is the most significant element in determining expansion of the
scope of duty is borne out by the Biakanja test. The first four factors of the
Biakanja test deal with identifying individual plaintiffs and defining the
class of future plaintiffs, both prime administrative concerns.
53. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1962).
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Privity was again the issue, and the court reaffirmed the test set
out in Biakanja. Five of the same factors were repeated.M A-new
factor replacing the fifth factor was "whether the recognition of lia-
bility to beneficiaries of wills negligently drawn by attorneys
would impose an undue burden on the profession."' 5 5 The court
held that the first five factors all pointed toward imposing liability
upon the attorney.5 6 In considering whether the recognition of lia-
bility to third parties would place an undue burden on the profes-
sion, the court reasoned that although in some situations liability
could be large and unpredictable in amount, this is also true of an
attorney's liability to a client. The court held that an extension of
liability to third parties would not place an undue burden on the
profession, particularly in light of the fact that "a contrary conclu-
sion would cause the innocent beneficiary to bear the loss.''57
Lucas v. Hamm establishes that privity is not a bar to actions
by third parties against attorneys, so long as certain factors ap-
ply.P8 The majority of courts still require privity in attorney mal-
practice actions 59 but there is evidence that this is changing.60
54. The factor of "the moral blame attached to defendant's conduct," see text
accompanying note 52 supra, was omitted, indicating that it was included in
Biakanja solely because defendant in that case had violated a statute by un-
dertaking the unauthorized practice of law.
55. Lucas v. Harm, 56 Cal. 2d at 589, 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
56. The court noted:
As in Biakanja, one of the main purposes which the transaction be-
tween defendant and the testator intended to accomplish was to pro-
vide for the transfer of property to plaintiffs; the damage to plaintiffs
in the event of invalidity of the bequest was clearly foreseeable; it
became certain, upon the death of the testator without change of the
will, that the plaintiffs would have received the intended benefits but
for the asserted negligence of defendant, and if persons such as
plaintiffs are not permitted to recover for the loss resulting from neg-
ligence of the draftsman, no one would be able to do so, and the pol-
icy of preventing future harm would be impaired.
Id.
57. Id.
58. While the court held that beneficiaries can recover against attorneys who
draft wills negligently, it imposed no liability in this particular case. The
court held that, as the attorney's error involved the rule against perpetu-
ities--a "technicality-ridden legal nightmare"--the attorney did not as a mat-
ter of law violate the applicable standard of care in misapplying the rule. Id.
at 592, 364 P.2d at 690, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
59. See note 30 .supra.
60. Courts have relaxed privity requirements in actions brought by beneficiaries
against attorneys for negligently drafting wills: See Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d
223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969); Licata v. Spector, 26 Conn. Supp. 378,
225 A.2d 28 (C.P. 1966); Succession of Killingsworth, 292 So. 2d 536 (La. 1973).
A similar result has been obtained in actions by purchasers of real estate
against the sellers' attorneys for approving defective titles. See, e.g., Wil-
liams v. Polgar, 391 Mich. 6, 215 N.W.2d 149 (1974). In a case expressly follow-
ing Lucas v. Hamm the Arizona Court of Appeals held that attorneys for the
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Adherence to a strict privity requirement is of course more ad-
ministratively convenient for courts. 61 However, use of the
Biakanja-Lucas test for defining the class to whom a duty is owed
would ease some of the administrative difficulties, and make it
possible to define and predict to whom an attorney owes a duty of
care.62 Further, considerations of preventing future harm point to-
ward abolition of the privity requirement. For example, if privity
were a complete bar to an action brought by beneficiaries under a
will against an attorney for negligently drafting the will, there
would be little or no sanction against the attorney, and hence no
impetus to avoid the mistake in the future. After all, the only
party who could bring an action would be dead.
Finally, it is more economically just to place the cost of the at-
torney's misfeasance on the party best able to afford it-the attor-
ney, who can protect against loss by purchasing malpractice
insurance. It is totally inequitable to allow the burden of an attor-
ney's misfeasance to rest upon an innocent party, who can do noth-
ing to protect against it.63
conservator of an incompetent owed a duty of care to the incompetent as well
as the conservator. Fickett v. Superior Court, 27 Ariz. App. 793, 558 P.2d 988(1976).
61. See note 23 supra.
62. It would seem clear under this test that an attorney who drafts a will or
searches a title should owe a duty to those who would reasonably be ex-
pected to rely on those services. In the case of a will, the class of third party
beneficiaries would be small, and usually confined to those who would take
under the will. In the case of a title search undertaken at the behest of a
seller, the class of prospective buyers/plaintiffs could conceivably be quite
large. But even though the transaction would not be intended to directly
affect any particular plaintiff, this factor would be overbalanced by the close-
ness of the connection between the attorney's conduct and the plaintiff's
harm, and the foreseeability of harm to prospective purchasers. See text ac-
companying note 52 supra.
63. A benefit to the legal profession may also accrue from relaxation of the priv-
ity requirement. Due to the status and responsible position of attorneys in
the community, they must always maintain a high standard of conduct to-
ward the court and community. Maintenance of the privity requirement in
attorney malpractice cases, when it has been relaxed in other areas of tort
law, is at odds with the high standard of conduct required of attorneys. It
smacks of bias on the part of the courts toward the legal profession, giving
rise to public skepticism toward the legal system. Elimination of the privity
requirement in attorney malpractice cases will not in itself change the pub-
lic's attitude. But by keeping the privity requirement in attorney malpractice
cases consistent with other areas of tort law, the legal profession will be tak-
ing a small step toward improvement of its image in this country. Averill,
supra note 25, at 402-03.
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IV. NEGLIGENCE-THE APPLICABLE STANDARD
OF CARE
The third issue in a negligence action is the violation of a duty,
or negligence. Assuming it has been established that the conduct
of defendant contributed to plaintiff's injury,6 the risk of which
falls within the scope of defendant's duty,65 plaintiff must still
prove that defendant violated a duty to plaintiff with respect to the
injury suffered. 'This is the negligence issue, the heart of the neg-
ligence action."66 It is the function of the trial judge to determine
whether the evidence is sufficient to raise the issue, and if it is, to
submit it to the jury.67
Just what constitutes the standard of care in legal malpractice
cases is open to some question. Plaintiffs used to be required to
prove that their attorney had been grossly negligent in order to re-
cover.68 Most courts now, however, require proof only of simple
negligence.69 A typical statement of this standard of care is found
64. See § H of text supra.
65. See § III of text supra.
66. Green, The Submission of Issues in Negligence Cases, 18 U. MAln L. REv. 30,
37 (1963).
67. Id. Green notes that even after causal relation and breach of duty have been
established, many courts still insist that the jury find that the defendant's
negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. The Negligence
Action, supra note 2, at 381. According to Green, proximate cause is a false
issue under modern negligence doctrine; it is a throwback to early common
law actions such as trespass where liability turned on cause. Under modem
negligence doctrines, liability turns on fault or negligence rather than cause.
The only cause issue in negligence is causal relation. Proximate cause is a
"dead doctrinal limb" which should have been lopped off long ago, and
should not now be used by courts to defeat innumerable cases which have
already been subjected to the litigation process and resolved in plantiff's
favor. Id.
68. Evans v. Watrous, 2 Port. 205 (Ala. 1835) (attorney not liable to client unless
guilty of "crassa neglentia"); Mardis' Adm'rs v. Shackleford, 4 Ala. 493 (1842)
(an attorney is liable only for gross negligence, which is usually a question of
fact for the jury); Babbitt v. Bumpus, 73 Mich. 331, 41 N.W. 417 (1889) (no
recovery for error in the conduct of litigation unless errors relied on were
"very gross").
The rationale behind the requirement of proof of gross negligence was
stated in Babbitt v. Bumpus, 73 Mich. at 338, 41 N.W. at 419:
[T]he fact that the best lawyers in the country find themselves mis-
taken as to what the law is, and are constantly differing as to the
application of the law to a given state of facts, and even the ablest
jurists find themselves frequently differing as to both, shows both
the fallacy and danger of any other doctrine ....
There is considerable doubt, however, as to whether a different standard of
care from that of ordinary negligence was actually intended. See Wade, The
Attorney's Liability for Negligence, in PRoFEssIoNAL NEGUGENCE 222 (T.
Roady & W. Anderson eds. 1960).
69. See, e.g., Pete v. Henderson, 124 Cal. App. 2d 487,269 P.2d 78 (1954); Sjobeck v.
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in Hodges v. Carter:70
Ordinarily when an attorney engages in the practice of the law and con-
tracts to prosecute an action in behalf of his client, he impliedly repre-
sents that (1) he possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill, and
ability necessary to the practice of his profession and which others simi-
larly situated ordinarily possess; (2) he will exert his best judgment in the
prosecution of the litigation entrusted to him; and (3) he will exercise rea-
sonable and ordinary care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the
application of his knowledge to his client's cause.
7 1
However, there has not been a definitive statement of the standard
of care required in attorney malpractice actions, and the standard
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.7 2 For example, some
courts apply an objective standard of care, which judges an attor-
ney's conduct against the action other attorneys would have taken
in similar circumstances.73 Others apply a subjective standard
which takes into account the good faith effort of an attorney to ex-
ercise his or her best judgment.7 4
Leach, 213 Minn. 360, 6 N.W.2d 819 (1942); Gabbert v. Evans, 184 Mo. App. 283,
166 S.W. 635 (1914); Malone v. Gerth, 100 Wis. 166, 75 N.W. 972 (1898); Annot.,
45 A.L.R.2d 5 (1956).
70. 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954).
71. Id. at 519, 80 S.E.2d at 145-46. In non-professional negligence actions, the
standard of care by which the defendant's duty is defined is that of a reason-
ably prudent person. In a professional negligence action, however, the de-
fendant's duty is defined by the profession to which he or she belongs in
terms of the minimum quality of professional conduct customarily provided
by the members of that profession. Note, Standard of Care in Legal
Malpractice, 43 IND. L.J. 771, 773 (1968). In a professional malpractice action
plaintiff must prove that defendant departed from a standard of care custom-
ary to the profession. This standard of care for professional malpractice rec-
ognizes that where specialized skills and knowledge are involved, jurors are
not competent to implement a standard of care by reference to their own ex-
perience and knowledge as reasonable persons. Id.
72. See, e.g., Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 150, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864, 865
(1961) (attorney must use "such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of
ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise"); Citizens' Loan,
Fund & Say. Ass'n v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143, 146,23 N.E. 1075, 1076 (1889) (attor-
ney must exercise skill commensurate with that possessed by "well informed
members of his profession"); Cochrane v. Little, 71 Md. 323, 332, 18 A. 698, 701
(1889) (attorney must use "a fair average degree of professional skill and
knowledge").
73. Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 150, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864, 865-66 (1961)
(attorney must use "such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordi-
nary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise"); Cochrane v. Little,
71 Md. 323, 331-32, 18 A. 698, 701 (1889) (client has a right to "a fair average
degree of professional skill and knowledge").
74. Palmer v. Nissen, 256 F. Supp. 497, 501 (D. Me. 1966) (attorney required only
to act "with good faith, to the best of his skill"); Stevens v. Walker & Dexter,
55 IlM. 151, 153 (1870) (attorney will not be held responsible if he acts "to the
best of his skill and knowledge"); Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517,520,80 S.E.2d
144, 146 (1954) (attorney must exercise his "best judgment"); Denzer v.
Rouse, 48 Wis. 2d 528, 534, 180 N.W.2d 521, 525 ("an attorney is bound to exer-
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Aside from these differences, which focus on the formulation of
the standard of care, there remains the issue of how high the stan-
dard of care should be within different areas of the profession.
The question remains as to whether there should be different
standards of care for attorneys practicing in different localities,
and whether there should be a higher standard of care for special-
ists.
A. The Locality Standard
In cases of medical malpractice the rule is well established that
a physician will be held to a standard of care based on the actions
of doctors in the same or a similar locality.75 The object of this
qualified standard was to protect the country physician, who did
not have access to new techniques and developments available to
urban doctors.76 In most cases of legal malpractice, however, a
standard based on locality is seldom mentioned,77 or if mentioned
is not considered a decisive factor in determining the propriety of
the attorney's conduct.7 8 But even though modern technology
may have eliminated one rationale in favor of a local standard of
care,79 a strong argument may still be made that legal malpractice
cise his best judgment in the light of his education and experience"). Cf.
Friday v. State Bar, 23 Cal. 2d 501, 505, 144 P.2d 564, 567 (1943) ("he must per-
form his duties to the best of his individual ability, not the standard of ability
required of lawyers generally in the community") (disciplinary proceeding).
Use of a subjective standard in attorney malpractice cases is anomalous in
light of the objective reasonable man standard employed in other areas of
negligence law. Although it may seem unfair to hold attorneys liable when
they have performed to the best of their ability, it is even more unfair to make
the client pay for the attorney's mistakes simply because the attorney has
failed to live up to the profession's standard of care.
75. Baker v. United States, 343 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1965); Peterson v. Carter, 182 F.
Supp. 393 (D. Wis. 1960); Harvey v. Kellen, 115 Ariz. 490, 566 P.2d 297 (1977);
Horton v. Vickers, 142 Conn. 105, 111 A.2d 675 (1955); Salinetro v. Nystrom, 341
So. 2d 1059 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977); Bassett v. Glock, 368 N.E.2d 18 (Ind. App.
1977); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, in PRoFESSIoNAL
NEGLIGENCE 33 (T. Roady & W. Anderson eds. 1960).
76. McCoid, supra note 75, at 33.
77. Cf. Pitt v. Yalden, 98 Eng. Rep. 74, 75 (K.B. 1767) (defendant-attorneys re-
lieved of liability because "they were country attornies; and might not, and
probably did not know thatthis point [of law] was settled here above"). The
reason for not recognizing a locality standard of care is obvious: one who
passes a state bar examination presumably is competent to practice any-
where in the state. Comment, 26 Am. U.L. REV., supra note 12, at 416-17.
78. Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1961); Hillegas'
Adm'r v. Bender, 78 Ind. 225 (1881); Cochrane v. Little, 71 Md. 323, 18 A. 698
(1889).
79. One commentator urges:
Today, methods of rapid transportation and easy communication vir-
tually have eliminated the need for different standards. The duty of
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should be judged on the basis of local conditions of practice.80
Notwithstanding the fact that modern technology has contrib-
uted greatly to standardizing the practice of law, the fact remains
that differences in resources and opportunities exist for attorneys
in widely varying communities. For example, attorneys in large
metropolitan areas are generally considered to be more sophisti-
cated than their rural counterparts,8 1 and problems which are com-
mon to a city practice may be unknown in a small rural
community. It would thus seem unfair to hold a small town attor-
ney with limited resources to the standard of care of an attorney
practicing in a large city, where greater resources would be avail-
able and where local procedures and practices might well be more
stringent.
Moreover, even if no difference exists in resources or sophisti-
cation from one community to another, it is still likely that differ-
ences in customary legal practice will develop. Attorneys may be
influenced in their conduct by the characteristics of the commu-
nity in which they practice. In Gleason v. Title Guarantee Co.,8 2
for example, defendant was an attorney who undertook to certify
titles to property for plaintiff. Because of a land boom in the
county, the attorney did not make title examinations on his own,
but depended on local title companies. The information which the
title companies used was not up to date at the time of the attor-
ney's certification, and prior encumbrances not listed in the certifi-
an attorney can no longer be fulfilled merely by utilizing the re-
sources at hand in the particular town where he is practicing. The
borders of the community have, in effect, been extended to include
those readily accessible centers where adequate information is avail-
able. Thus, if an attorney fails to inform himself adequately on a
matter of state law, he should not be permitted to excuse his failure
simply by claiming that information on the matter was not available
in the community.
Comment, 26 Am. U.L, REv., supra note 12, at 417.
80. See Note, supra note 71, at 782 (locality of practice limitation on standard of
care is even more appropriate in legal malpractice than in medical malprac-
tice).
81. Id. This conclusion is based in part upon the fact that urban attorneys engage
in specialization more than rural attorneys. Cantrall, A Country Lawyer
Looks at "Specialization, "48 A.BAJ. 1117 (1962); Comment, Legal Effects of
Attorney Specialization, 30 ALs. L. REv. 282 (1966). The conclusion that ur-
ban attorneys are more sophisticated than rural attorneys may be borne out
statistically. To the extent that large firm practices are concentrated in large
cities, with rural practices being primarily solo, the statistics found in Ladin-
sky, The Impact of Social Backgrounds of Lawyers on Law Practice and the
Law, 16 J. LEGAL ED. 127 (1963) are applicable. Ladinsky reports that 73 per-
cent of the attorneys in large firms surveyed attended national or "prestige"
law schools (Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Michigan, and Yale), while only 14
percent of the attorneys in solo practice attended such schools. Id. at 132.
82. 317 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963).
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cation caused plaintiff's title to fail. The court held that evidence
was properly admissible as to the standard of care of professional
conduct prevailing in the county at the time.83 Thus, an attorney
who pronounces a title marketable according to local standards
would not necessarily be negligent merely because in a similar
community the title would have been unmarketable.
A similar result obtained in Cook v. Irion.8 4 Plaintiffs sued
their attorney, alleging that he was negligent in suing only one of
three possible defendants in a personal injury case. Plaintiffs sub-
mitted testimony of an attorney from a small town 200 miles away
from the forum of the original action. The testimony was to the
effect that the defendant attorney violated the standard of care of
the average practitioner in the state in not suing all three possible
defendants.85 The court held that an attorney practicing in a
vastly different locality would not be qualified to second guess the
judgment of an experienced attorney of the forum county-which
had a much higher population than the county in which the wit-
ness practiced.86
Many courts still adhere to a state-wide standard of care, how-
ever.87 One writer suggests a solution for the apparently conflict-
ing rules: whenever an attorney's conduct is challenged in light of
a state law or procedure, a statewide standard should be used; but
in the absence of a state law question, the conduct of an attorney
who has acted in accordance with local procedures should be mea-
sured by a community standard.88 Adoption of a locality rule may
cause some problems,89 but it would in fact operate to recognize
actual practice in attorney malpractice actions, and would help to
standardize such actions. As it stands now, when testimony by
other attorneys is necessary to establish a standard of care, the
83. Id. at 60.
84. 409 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
85. Id. at 477.
86. Id. at 478.
87. See, e.g., Feil v. Wishek, 193 N.W.2d 218, 224-25 (N.D. 1971) (attorney who
failed to advise clients to file a sales agreement in accordance with state law
found negligent) Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Clausing, 73 Wash. 2d 393, 395, 438
P.2d 865, 866 (1968) ('TIhe standards of practice for lawyers in this jurisdiction
... are the same throughout the state, and do not differ in its various com-
munities."); Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975) (ex-
pressly following Cook). Cf. Watkins v. Sheppard, 278 So. 2d 890 (La. App.
1973) (attorney must use degree of care exercised by attorneys practicing in
the community).
88. Comment, 26 Am. U.L. REv., supra note 12, at 416. Such a rule may, of course,
create more problems than it solves. It may be quite difficult to determine
when a state or local procedure is involved, or there may be a combination of
the two. Further, and more importantly, such a rule would be contrary to the
policy of promoting uniform legal practice throughout a state.
89. See note 88 supra.
1019
1020 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 4 (1978)
defendant would tend to draw heavily upon the local bar for his or
her testimony, and thereby automatically place a locality of prac-
tice limitation upon the standard of care. Plaintiff, however,
would have no tendency to draw upon the local bar, but would in-
stead use testimony of an attorney from another locality to try to
establish a different or higher standard of care.90 At least by im-
posing a standard of care based on local conduct in legal malprac-
tice cases, attorneys would have a better idea of what type of
conduct constitutes, negligence, and much confusion over conflict-
ing standards of care could be eliminated.9 1
B. The Standard of Care for Specialists
It is well established in the field of medical malpractice that a
physician who holds him or herself out as a specialist will be held
to a higher standard of care than one who is a general practi-
tioner.92 The issue remains, however, as to whether attorneys
who specialize 93 should be held to a higher standard of care than
general practitioners. Despite statements to the effect that the
duties and liabilities of attorneys and physicians are analogous,
94
courts have been hesitant to ascribe a higher standard of care to
attorneys who specialize.95 In one case, for example, an attorney's
90. See Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
91. Note, supra note 71, at 781.
92. Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181
(3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 980 (1952); Harris v. Campbell, 2 Ariz.
App. 351, 409 P.2d 67 (1965); Scarano v. Schnoor, 158 Cal. App. 2d 612, 323 P.2d
178 (1958); Crovella v. Cochrane, 102 So. 2d 307 (Fla. Ct. App. 1958); Worster v.
Caylor, 231 Ind. 625, 110 N.E.2d 337 (1953); McCoid, supra note 75, at 30. Cf.
Schwab v. Tolley, 345 So. 2d 747 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977) (neurosurgeon could not
be held to more than skill and diligence of average practitioner).
93. The American Bar Association permits attorneys to designate themselves as
Patent Lawyers (providing they are admitted to practice before the United
States Patent Office) or Trademark or Admiralty Lawyers, if they are actively
engaged in those areas of law. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESpONSIBmrrY
Dr 2-105(A1) (1970). Similarly, the American Bar Association permits the
certification of attorneys as specialists under state law. Id. at EC 2-14. Be-
yond these areas of specialization sanctioned by the American Bar Associa-
tion, the fact of attorney specialization, especially in urban areas, is well
known. Comment, supra note 81, at 282-83.
94. See Citizens' Loan, Fund & Say. Ass'n v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143, 145, 23 N.E.
1075, 1076 (1889):
Attorneys are very properly held to the same rules of liability for
want of professional skill and diligence in practice, and for erroneous
or negligent advice to those who employ them, as are physicians and
surgeons and other persons who hold themselves out to the world as
possessing skill and qualifications in their respective trades or pro-
fessions.
See also Note, supra note 71, at 772.
95. It has been argued that since attorneys do not have formal advanced training
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actions were measured by the abilities of the average attorney,
with no mention of special skill or expertise, even though he had
represented himself as especially qualified in the defense of crimi-
nal cases. 96
Given the realities of modern legal practice, it is logical to hold
attorneys who specialize to a higher standard of care than general
practitioners. A client frequently selects an attorney specifically
because that attorney restricts his or her practice to a field in
which the client has a problem. The client expects such an attor-
ney to possess a higher degree of knowledge and skill than a gen-
eral practitioner. Indeed, a client will often pay a premium in the
form of a higher fee in order to obtain a higher degree of skill.
This expectation should be protected by the courts.
There are two theories under which a higher standard of care
for the legal specialist may be formulated and applied.97 The first
is the "holding out" approach. Under this theory, attorneys who
represent themselves as specialists will be held to the standard of
care of specialists, whether they are specialists in fact or not.98
The underlying rationale would be to fulfill the just expectations of
the client. The holding out approach is especially helpful in that it
avoids the difficulties of identifying the uncertified defendant-spe-
cialist, since the holding out exists independently of any formal
recognition of specialization.99
In Wright v. Williams,10 0 the California Court of Appeals ap-
plied the holding out theory and held an attorney who represented
himself as a specialist to a higher standard of care. The attorney, a
specialist in maritime law, was sued for negligence in failing to in-
in a specialty and are not certified by the state or other authority to practice
in specialized fields, they should not be compared to medical specialists.
Comment, supra note 81, at 285. Since the American Bar Association has
permitted the certification of specialists in some areas, see note 93 supra, this
argument has lost much of its force. It still retains validity with regard to
those who specialize in areas outside of those recognized by the American
Bar Association.
96. Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934).
97. Note, supra note 71, at 787.
98. RE STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 299A, Comment d (1965) follows this ap-
proach.
An actor undertaking to render services may represent that he has
superior skill or knowledge, beyond that common to his profession or
trade. In that event he incurs an obligation to the person to whom
he makes such a representation, to have, and to exercise, the skill
and knowledge which he represents himself to have. Thus a physi-
cian who holds himself out as a specialist in certain types of practice
is required to have the skill and knowledge common to other special-
ists.
99. Note, supra note 71, at 787; see note 95 supra.
100. 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1975).
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form plaintiffs about a flaw in the title to a boat they intended to
buy. The court held that "a lawyer holding himself out to the pub-
lic and the profession as specializing in an area of the law must
exercise the skill, prudence, and diligence exercised by other spe-
cialists of ordinary skill and capacity specializing in the same
field."''1 1 Thus, whether or not attorneys are engaged in a formally
recognized speciality, as long as they hold themselves out as spe-
cialists so as to create justifiably high expectations in their clients,
they should be held to the higher standard of care.10 2
The second approach for imposing a higher standard of care is
based on the subjective, personal qualifications of attorneys rather
than on any representation of specialization. Under some subjec-
tive articulations of the standard of care, attorneys are required to
exercise their own best judgment, to the best of their skill. 10 3 As
fiduciaries and agents of their clients, it is arguable that attorneys
who possess knowledge and skills superior to those of general
practitioners would not discharge their duty to their clients unless
they exercised that superior skill and knowledge.04
101. Id. at 810, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 199. The court of appeals based its holding on the
prior case of Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621
(1975), which stated that the standard of care applicable to attorneys for mal-
practice is that of members of the profession "in the same or a similar locality
under similar circumstances." Id. at 355 n.3, 530 P.2d at 592 n.3, 118 Cal. Rptr.
at 624 n.3. The Wright court reasoned that one who holds himself out as a
legal specialist performs in circumstances similar to other specialists but not
to general practitioners. Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d at 810, 121 Cal.
Rptr. at 199.
102. The holding out approach may be extended beyond the mere holding out as a
specialist. The fact that some lawyers charge higher fees for the same serv-
ices than others might raise higher expectations in clients. If this is the case,
lawyers who charge higher fees should be held to a higher standard of care
than other lawyers in order to insure that the just expectations of the client
are fulfilled and that the client gets what he or she pays for. This may be a
weak argument, however, in light of the rule which makes it unnecessary to
show that a fee was paid in order to hold an attorney liable for malpractice.
The duty to exercise the requisite care and skill is imposed upon the attorney
when the case is undertaken regardless of whether compensation is to be
received. See Spangler v. Sellers, 5 F. 882 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1881); Moormen v.
Wood, 117 Ind. 144, 19 N.E. 739 (1889); Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 5, 14 (1956). If it is
not necessary to show that a fee was paid in order to hold an attorney liable, a
fortiori the amount of fee paid should be irrelevant in regard to the standard
of care.
103. See note 74 & accompanying text supra.
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379, Comment c (1958) ("it would be
the ordinary understanding that [an agent] is to exercise any special knowl-
edge or skill which he may have"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299,
Comment f (1965) ("If the actor possesses special competence, he must exer-
cise it, not only in his profession, trade, or occupation, but also whenever a
reasonable man in his position would realize that its exercise is necessary to
the reasonable safety of others.").
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One case has in fact been decided under this rationale, al-
though the standard of care owed to the client was founded upon
an express contract, rather than implied from the agency relation-
ship. In Childs v. CoMStock,10 5 defendant attorneys had been re-
tained to protest the imposition of a duty upon the client's imports.
When the duty was upheld, the attorneys failed to make a timely
appeal. They sought to excuse their failure to appeal on the
ground that notice of decisions was given irregularly. The court
held them liable:
The defendants were experts in that line of business, and... they repre-
sented a very large percentage of all protests filed against the imposition
of tariff duties that were heard before the board of general appraisers.
They were familiar with the practice of the government officials, and
aware of the risk in relying on the irregular practice in the transmission of
notices of their decisions....
... [The attorneys'] liability depends upon their contract. They ex-
pressly agreed to "take all such steps as ma be requisite ... to prosecute
[the cases now pending] to a conclusion."'- 6
The court went on to hold that the defendant attorneys had vio-
lated their express duty to their client under the contract, as well
as their implied duty arising from their superior skill and knowl-
edge.
The problem with this subjective approach is that it would not
allow an unambiguous recognition of legal specialization. 10 7 It
would be preferable to recognize that legal specialization is a fact
of legal practice, and to simply state that the standard of care must
be higher when an attorney is a legal specialist. 0 8
C. Strict Liability
One possible means of setting the standard of care would de-
pend not on what lawyers represent themselves to be, but on what
they undertake to do.'0 9 Thus, if an attorney undertook to certify
something as a fact, he or she would be held strictly liable for such
certification, but an attorney merely venturing an opinion would
be held to the normal standard of care.11 0 According to Leon
105. 69 A.D. 160, 74 N.Y.S. 643 (1902).
106. Id. at 165-66, 74 N.Y.S. at 646-47.
107. Note, supra note 71, at 788.
108. Id. It is evident, of course, that application of a higher standard of care for
specialists will cause some difficulties. In the area of proof, for example,
when it is necessary for a plaintiff to employ expert testimony in order to
establish that a higher standard of care exists, there is a danger that the need
for expert testimony will make attorneys reluctant to testify against their
brethren, giving rise to a "conspiracy of silence" in the legal profession.
Comment, supra note 81, at 286-87.
109. See Green, The Duty to Give Accurate Information, 12 U.C-A. L REv. 464
(1965); Wade, supra note 68, at 227.
110. One court states the distinction this way.
1023
1024 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 4 (1978)
Green, a professional who certifies something as a fact has a duty
not merely to use care and be diligent, but to be accurate. 1 '
Under this analysis the risk of injury falls upon the person who
undertakes to speak, whether the mistake is intended or is the re-
sult of innocent error.112
The reason behind this rule is simple. Most certifications of
fact arise in the area of financial transactions-accountants pre-
pare and certify balance sheets,113 public weighers weigh and cer-
tify goods,114 and warehousemen give information as to the storage
of goods.115 In financial transactions, certainty, ease in determin-
ing liability and uniformity in result are extremely important.116
In order to give the law in this area the required degree of predict-
ability and decisiveness a rule of strict liability must be used.
117
Two cases serve to illustrate this rule. In Biakanja v. Irving,"l 8
defendant, a notary public, undertook to prepare a will for the tes-
tator. Defendant failed to fulfill the technical requirements neces-
sary for validation of a will, and when the will failed the sole
beneficiary thereunder sued defendant for the difference between
the amount she would have received under the will and the
amount she actually did receive. The court found the defendant
liable for failure to use due care, but the situation actually gave
rise to a duty on the part of defendant to assume the risk of having
In a litigation a lawyer is well warranted in taking chances .... The
conduct of a lawsuit involves questions of judgment and discretion,
as to which even the most distinguished members of the profession
may differ. They often present subtle and doubtful questions of law.
If in such cases a lawyer errs on a question not elementary or conclu-
sively settled by authority, that error is one of judgment, for which he
is not liable. But passing titles, as a rule, is of an entirely different
nature. A purchaser of real estate is entitled not only to a good, but to
a marketable, title .... It is therefore the duty of a conveyancer to
see that his client obtains a marketable title, and to reject titles in-
volved in doubt, unless the client is fully informed of the nature of
the risk, and is willing to accept it. A careful lawyer might readily
advise a client that he was entitled to a piece of real property, and
that it was proper to bring an action for its recovery, while at the
same time he would unhesitantly reject a title which involved the
same question as to which he advised a suit.
Byrnes v. Palmer, 18 A.D. 1, 4-5, 45 N.Y.S. 479, 481-82 (1897).
111. Green, supra note 109, at 487.
112. Id. at 472.
113. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
114. Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
115. International Prods. Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (1927).
116. Green, supra note 109, at 472.
117. Id. at 470-71. Unlike strict liability cases, where the rule of liability is uni-
form, negligence cases concentrate on the individual nature of each case, and
"fujnlformity and certainty of result are not only impossible but undesir-
able." Id. at 471.
118. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
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failed in his undertaking.1 9 Plaintiff's injuries were in the nature
of those incurred in financial transactions, and, because defendant
undertook in essence to certify a fact, "[t] he duty imposed by the
defendant's undertaking was to prepare and to execute a will in
compliance with the statutory requisites of the law of California
vesting in the plaintiff the property of the testator at the latter's
death, and not merely to use due care to do so. ' '12O
In Lucas v. Hamm,12 1 however, an attorney undertook to draw a
will, one portion of which failed as being in violation of the rule
against perpetuities. Rather than holding the attorney strictly lia-
ble, the court properly applied a standard of ordinary care. In this
case "[t]he conduct of the attorney at the level here involved lies
in the area of professional judgment of the legalist on a question of
law about which no one's opinion can be certain .... -122 The un-
dertaking of defendant in Lucas was not in the nature of certifying
a fact, which involved mere application of definite procedures as in
Biakanja. Lucas involved the exercise of legal judgment, and the
attorney's actions were more in the nature of a statement of opin-
ion.
Thus, one who undertakes to give information of fact should be
held strictly liable for mistatements of fact, while a standard of or-
dinary care should apply to one who undertakes to exercise judg-
ment. Similarly, one who undertakes to certify ascertainable facts
should be held to a strict standard, while one who undertakes to




Assuming that a plaintiff's protected interest has been injured
by defendant's negligent conduct, the issue remains as to what
compensation should be awarded. Leon Green posits a rule for
determining what .items of damages should be allowed: "[E]very
item of loss for which the plaintiff may recover must be found by
the court to fall within the scope of the defendant's duty with re-
spect to the risk of injury imposed on the plaintiff."' 24 The prob-
lem of determining what damages to award "is the same as that of
defining the scope of the protection afforded by the rule invoked
for the protection of the injured interest.'1 In other words, when
119. Green, supra note 109, at 479-80.
120. Id. at 479.
121. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, cert denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1961).
122. Green, supra note 109, at 481.
123. Id. at 482.
124. Green, supra note 66, at 46.
125. L. GREEN, supra note 4, at 187.
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a rule is established that defendant owes plaintiff a duty, the scope
of the duty is co-extensive with the items compensable in dam-
ages. Both the scope of the duty and the items compensable in
damages are determined by public policy.126
According to one source,127 there is little that is unusual in the
law of damages as applied to attorney malpractice. The amount of
damages to be awarded should compensate for the injury plaintiff
received. If the attorney's negligence caused plaintiff to lose title
to property, the measure of recovery is the value of the property.128
And if the attorney is negligent in prosecuting plaintiff's claim, the
amount recoverable in the malpractice action is the amount that
would have been secured in the original action but for the negli-
gence. 2 9 Further, if plaintiff would have recovered punitive dam-
ages in the original action, but due to the attorney's negligence the
action is not brought, plaintiff can recover the amount of punitive
damages from defendant. 3 0 And where a suit is dismissed due to
the attorney's negligence, plaintiff is entitled to recover from the
attorney for additional costs and expenses incurred in attempting
to reinstate the action.13' However, damages may not be reduced
by any contingent fee the attorney might have earned had his or
her responsibilities been successfully carried out,132 but a mal-
practice judgment may be reduced if plaintiff's own negligence has
contributed to the loss. 33 All of these items of damages clearly
fall within the scope of defendant's duty to plaintiff.
There is, however, one area of damages seldom mentioned or
employed in attorney malpractice cases-punitive damages. Pu-
nitive damages are "sums awarded apart from any compensatory
126. An example from the field of attorney malpractice will illustrate the rule. If
an attorney who undertakes to draft a will owes a duty of care to third party
beneficiaries of the will, he or she will be liable to them if the will is drafted
negligently. Damages will be the difference between the amount that the
beneficiaries would have received under a properly drafted will and the
amount they actually receive. This would be a proper element of damages
because the attorney's duty to the third party beneficiaries is to protect them
against just such losses. But assume that the house of one of the benefi-
ciaries has been repossessed because he counted on receiving the entire
amount of the legacy under a properly drafted will. Even though this injury
flowed from the attorney's negligence it would not be a proper element of
damages. It would be beyond the scope of the duty the attorney owes to the
third party beneficiaries. See generally L. GREEN, supra note 4, at 186-94.
127. Wade, supra note 68, at 233.
128. Whitney v. Abbott, 191 Mass. 59, 77 N.E. 524 (1906).
129. Freeman v. Rubin, 318 So. 2d 540 (Fla. Ct. App. 1975).
130. Patterson v. Wallace & Frazer, 79 S.W. 1077 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904).
131. Spering v. Sullivan, 361 F. Supp. 282 (D. Del. 1973).
132. Duncan v. Lord, 409 F. Supp. 687 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Bernard v. Walkup, 272 Cal.
App. 2d 595, 77 Cal. Rptr. 544 (1969).
133. McDow v. Dixon, 138 Ga. App. 338, 226 S.E.2d 145 (1976).
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or nominal damages, usually as punishment or deterrent levied be-
cause of particularly aggravated misconduct on the part of the de-
fendant."'134 The functions of punitive damages are fourfold:135
(1) to punish the wrongdoer; (2) to deter the wrongdoer and poten-
tial wrongdoers from similar misconduct in the future; (3) to en-
courage injured plaintiffs to act as private attorneys general and
thus increase the number of wrongdoers brought to justice; and (4)
to compensate the injured plaintiff for those injuries caused by de-
fendant's conduct which are not compensable at law.
Punitive damages are not awardable in all cases, and there are
some limitations on when an award of punitive damages is proper.
Since it is defendant's mental state rather than outward conduct
that is said to justify a punitive award,136 the defendant must be
shown to have the requisite evil intent in order to justify a punitive
award. Anything that negates a bad state of mind, such as where
defendant is found to have acted in good faith, will preclude a pu-
nitive award. 3 7 Moreover, punitive damages will not be awarded
unless the plaintiff has suffered actual damages. 138
Although not frequently used, punitive damages have occasion-
ally been approved in attorney malpractice cases. In Hill v.
Montgomery139 for example, the defendant-attorney had falsely
represented to plaintiff that he had secured a divorce for her, mak-
ing this representation solely in order to get his fee. This false
information led plaintiff to a second marriage that made her indict-
able for a felony. The court held the attorney liable for punitive
damages, citing the "perfidy" of his conduct and the dangers inci-
dent thereto as a justification for the award of such damages.140
Similarly, the court in Hall v. Wright'41 held an attorney liable for
punitive damages after he made fraudulent representations to his
client which caused her to lose her home. And, in Singleton v.
134. D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 204 (1973).
135. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MicH. L REV.
1257, 1277-99 (1976).
136. D. DOBBS, supra note 134, § 3.9, at 205.
137. Id. This limitation is sometimes qualified, however, to not require evil intent
where a defendant was grossly negligent, or where a defendant seriously
abused a position of privilege or power. Id. at 205-06. But cf. Welder v. Mer-
cer, 247 Ark, 999, 448 S.W.2d 952 (1970) (punitive damages held to require
showing of more than gross negligence, such as the element of intentional
wrong or a conscious indifference to consequences).
138. D. DOBBS, supra note 134, at 208; see also Clark Bros. v. Anderson & Perry, 211
Iowa 920, 234 N.W. 844 (1931) (attorney held not liable for punitive damages
for deceit when plaintiff suffered no actual damages).
139. 84 Ill. App. 300 (1899).
140. Id. at 303.
141. 261 Iowa 758, 156 N.W.2d 661 (1968).
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Foreman,142 an attorney was held liable for punitive damages
where he had so verbally abused, insulted and oppressed his own
client as to cause her extreme mental pain and suffering.
As illustrated by the above cases, the area of attorney malprac-
tice is peculiarly suited to the use of punitive damages. Because
of the nature of the legal profession the attorney occupies a posi-
tion which requires the highest of moral standards. Being privy to
sensitive information about clients, attorneys have great potential
for abusing their position and causing great harm to their clients,
as occurred in each of the above cases. In order to insure against
attorneys abusing their position of power some deterrent is essen-
tial. One possible deterrent is the threat of punitive damages.
Such was the rationale behind the decision to impose punitive
damages in Hill:
In the honorable calling professed by him the law required of [the attor-
ney] the utmost degree of fidelity toward all who might employ him. So
deeply imbedded is that idea in our jurisprudence, so jealous is the law of
the rights of a client dealing with his attorney, that not only is the attorney
precluded from taking advantage of his superior knowledge and skill to
the detriment of his client, but in all controversies between them the bur-
den is on him to show that he truthfully informed his client as to all the
facts and his rights in the premises.
143
The deterrent effect of punitive damages would be even more pro-
nounced in those situations in which there is no other official sanc-
tion against the attorney's misconduct. In Singleton, for example,
the attorney could have been disciplined for failing to carry out his
contract with the client,144 but it is doubtful that under the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility he could be punished for abus-
ing and oppressing his client-which was, after all, the most shock-
ing element of his conduct.
Finally, more liberal imposition of punitive damages would en-
courage clients to act as private attorneys general, to bring wrong-
doing attorneys to justice. Even if an attorney's conduct were
such as to warrant official sanctions, disciplinary proceedings are
seldom undertaken. Use of punitive damages as a "bounty" would
be especially useful in the legal profession, where violations of
substantive rules are difficult to detect or prove, and when en-
forcement of the rules is infrequent.14 5
142. 435 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1970).
143. 84 ll. App. at 303.
144. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A) (1970): "A lawyer
shall not intentionally ... (2) Fail to carry out a contract of employment en-
tered into with a client for professional services. . .
145. Owen, supra note 135, at 1287-89.
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VI. DEFENSES
As a defense to a charge of attorney malpractice, the defendant
may of course establish a defense which disproves any of the fore-
going requisites of causal relation, duty, breach of duty, and dam-
ages.'4 There are, however, two affirmative defenses that may be
raised to a charge of attorney malpractice: contributory negligence
and the statute of limitations.
The defense of contributory negligence is seldom raised in at-
torney malpractice actions, probably because in most instances
the client has placed the proceedings entirely under the control of
the attorney. 47 Nevertheless, the defense has been raised suc-
cessfully in several cases. For example, where the client was him-
self an attorney who chose the form of pleadings, he could not
recover from his attorney when those pleadings failed.' 48 And
where a client had directed his attorney to delay filing an appeal,
he could not recover from his attorney who did not file the appeal
until after the statute of limitations had run.1 49 A client may be
contributorily negligent for failing to disclose necessary informa-
tion 150 or for failing to use reasonable care to obtain information
for the attorney.15 ' However, under certain circumstances it may
be the duty of the attorney to make inquiries concerning the facts
and if he or she fails to do so, the client cannot be held contribu-
torily negligent for failing to volunteer the information.5 2 The
duty of an attorney to inquire as to the facts of a case should be a
question of law for the court.
153
Unlike contributory negligence, the defense of the statute of
limitations has been frequently and successfully asserted as a bar
to attorney malpractice actions. There are two major issues in the
application of the statute of limitations-which statute is applica-
ble, and when it begins to run.154
The limitation periods for contract and tort actions usually dif-
fer, with the period for contracts being longer.155 Whether the tort
146. The Negligence Action, supra note 2, at 375.
147. Annot, 45 AJ.LR.2d 5, 17 (1956).
148. Executrix of Carr v. Glover, 70 Mo. App. 242 (1897).
149. Tishomingo Elec. Light and Power Co. v. Gullett, 52 Okla. 180, 152 P. 849
(1915).
150. Hanson v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975).
151. Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966).
152. Hanson v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975).
153. See § III of text supra. Cf. Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App. at 87, 538 P.2d
at 1245 ("if it cannot be said that the duty to inquire or disclose was present
as a matter of law, then it is for the trier of the fact to decide ... whether
negligence existed on the part of the lawyer").
154. See Wade, supra note 68, at 234-35.
155. See, e.g., IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, §§ 15 & 17 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (providing for a
1029
1030 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 4 (1978)
or contract statute of limitations will apply to an attorney malprac-
tice claim will depend on whether the court characterizes the
claim as sounding in tort or contract. A number of courts have
held that regardless of how a plaintiff characterizes the claim, an
action against an attorney for malpractice is based on breach of
contract, and the contract statute of limitations must apply.15 6
Other courts have applied the tort statute of limitations, regardless
of whether the attorney-client relationship was based on a con-
tract. 5 7 Still others apparently allow plaintiffs to choose the the-
ory upon which they wish to proceed.158 And finally, a few courts
have reached the preferred position that a cause of action against
an attorney for malpractice is an amalgam of both tort and contract
theories, and that regardless of how plaintiff characterizes the suit,
all malpractice actions should be subject to the same statute of
limitations.159 This result is based on the rationale that an attor-
ney malpractice action is a hybrid of both tort and contract and
that it would be totally unjustified in a malpractice case to reach
different substantive results based upon distinctions having their
source "solely in the niceties of pleading and not in the underlying
realities.' 1 60
two year statute of limitations on personal injury actions, and a ten year pe-
riod of limitation on a written contract); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 260, §§ 2 &
2A (West Supp. 1978) (providing a six year limitation on contract claims and
a three year limitation on tort actions); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-205 & 207 (Reis-
sue 1975) (action upon a written contract must be brought within five years:
action for personal injury must be brought within two years).
156. See Sitton v. Clements, 385 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1967); Barret v. Burt, 250 F.
Supp. 904 (S.D. Iowa 1966); Juhnke v. Hess, 211 Kan. 438, 506 P.2d 1142 (1973);
Hillhouse v. McDowell, 219 Tenn. 362, 410 S.W.2d 162 (1966). Although the
statute of limitations for contract actions is longer than that for torts, applica-
tion of the contract statute of limitations may be disadvantageous to plaintiffs
since the limitation period will begin to run from the date of breach of con-
tract, not from the date of discovery of the breach. White v. Reagan, 32 Ark.
281 (1877); Riser v. Livsey, 138 Ga. App. 615, 227 S.E.2d 88 (1976); Galloway v.
Hood, 69 Ohio App. 278, 43 N.E.2d 631 (1941); Cornell v. Edson, 78 Wash. 662,
139 P. 602 (1914).
157. Quezada v. Hart, 67 Cal. App. 3d 754, 136 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977) (attorney mal-
practice action held basically a tort action based on attorney's negligence);
Corceller v. Brooks, 347 So. 2d 274 (La. App. 1977) (legal malpractice suit held
not based on breach of contract, despite the fact that a contractual agreement
established the attorney-client relationship).
158. See Juhnke v. Hess, 211 Kan. 438, 506 P.2d 1142 (1973); Bland v. Smith, 197
Tenn. 683, 277 S.W.2d 377 (1955).
159. In Higa v. Mirikitani, 55 Haw. 167, 517 P.2d 1 (1973), the court held that regard-
less of the nomenclature used by the plaintiff in a legal malpractice suit all
such actions should be governed by the same statute of limitations. Id. at
172, 517 P.2d at 4. See also Mumford v. Staton, Wahley & Price, 254 Md. 697,
255 A.2d 359 (1969).
160. Higa v. Mirikitani, 55 Haw. at 171-72, 517 P.2d at 4-5. Some states have
achieved the same result by statute, making the statute of limitations the
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Which statute of limitations applies is important not only be-
cause the statutes of limitation for tort and contract are of different
lengths,161 but also because under a tort cause of action the statute
of limitations does not begin to run until the injury is or reasonably
should be discovered.162 Application of the discovery rule to attor-
ney malpractice at first glance appears to be just and equita-
ble-after all, there are many situations in which an attorney's
malpractice would not be discovered until long after the negligent
act, with often disastrous results. 163 It would be inherently unfair
to require an innocent plaintiff to bear a loss simply because the
attorney's negligence remained hidden until the statute of limita-
tions had run.
Balancing this consideration, however, is the fact that complete
acceptance of the discovery rule would unjustly subject attorneys
to increased liability. One of the policies behind statutes of limita-
tions is to keep fraudulent and stale claims from springing up'6
and thereby bring a sense of security to human affairs. It would
be unfair to an attorney to subject him or her to liability for a negli-
gent title search, if the mistake were not discovered until a decade
after the certification.
One commentator has suggested that in order to resolve this
conflict, the cause of action should be required to be brought
within two years of the discovery of the injury, but in no case
should a cause of action be allowed to be commenced more than
six years from the date when the cause of action accrued.165 Such
a rule would create a desirable balance between the policies be-
hind the statute of limitations and the policy of allowing worthy
plaintiffs to recover on legal malpractice actions. By setting a re-
alistic time limit on attorneys' potential liability, the policies be-
hind the statute of limitations are fulfilled. Furthermore, by
giving plaintiffs a reasonable time in which to discover an attor-
same for all malpractice actions. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-208 (Reissue
1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (Supp. 1977).
161. See note 155 & accompanying text supra.
162. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 30, at 144-45.
163. E.g., Hendrickson v. Sears, 359 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mass. 1973) (defendant-attor-
ney certified title as marketable; nine years later plaintiffs found property to
be unmarketable because of undiscovered encumbrances); Lucas v. Hamam,
56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1962) (negligently drafted trust in will not discovered until after death of
testator); Eckert v. Schaal, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1, 58 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967) (negli-
gence of attorney in advising corporate client not discovered until share-
holder's derivative action filed more than two years later).
164. 53 C.J.S. Limitations ofActions § 1, at 902-03 (1948).
165. Note, The Commencement of the Statute of Limitations in Legal Malpractice
Actions-The Needfor Re-evaluation: Eckert v. Schaal, 15 U.CJA. L. REv.
230, 243 (1967).
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ney's negligence, the policy of allowing worthy plaintiffs to recover
is promoted.
CONCLUSION
Changes in the law of attorney malpractice are necessary to
keep this area of the law consistent with other rapidly changing
areas of tort liability. Further, the law of attorney malpractice
should reflect the ideals of fairness and equity toward which the
profession strives. The public should perceive that the law in this
area is not biased in favor of attorneys. To this end the profession
should be prepared to adopt such necessary changes as the relaxa-
tion of the privity requirement and a higher standard of care for
specialists. Adoption of such changes would be beneficial not
only to the injured plaintiff, but to the profession as a whole.
James Holman '78
